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None of the above 
How the UK Voted but Didn’t Decide on Brexit 
 
 
Carolus Grütters∗ 
1. Introduction1 
On 23 June 2016 the electorate in the UK cast their vote in a referendum on Brexit. 
The results showed a majority in favour of leaving the European Union. Consequently, 
Prime Minister David Cameron who was in favour of remaining in the European 
Union stepped down. Subsequently, Theresa May was elected as the new Conservative 
Party leader, becoming Britain’s 76th prime minister.2 
Prime Minister May who used the slogan ‘Brexit means Brexit’ promised to deliver 
Brexit. However, the Withdrawal Agreement she negotiated with the European Com-
mission was not accepted in the British parliament.3 The House of Commons voted 
three times on motions related to the Withdrawal Agreement, which was called ‘May’s 
deal’.4 But all three times the Commons voted her deal down.5 When she tried to ar-
range for a fourth vote on her deal she lost the support of her own party. Conclusively, 
she announced on 24 May 2019 that she was stepping down as Tory leader and there-
fore as prime minister, an office she had held for less than three years.  
After the defeat of the government in each of the three so-called ‘meaningful votes’ 
on the Withdrawal Agreement, motions were presented that blocked a no-deal Brexit. 
Interestingly, all of these motions against a no-deal Brexit were passed.6 This implied 
that the British parliament did not want the UK to leave the EU with May’s deal but 
neither without a deal. As Prime Minister May stated: ‘The world knows what this 
house does not want. Today we need to send an emphatic message about what we do 
want.’7 In order to decide what alternative to May’s deal would be acceptable to Parli-
ament a series of so-called ‘indicative votes’ were held.8 On 27 March 2019 a first round 
                                                        
∗  Centre for Migration Law, Radboud University Nijmegen, the Netherlands. 
1  I have respectfully borrowed the title ‘None of the Above’ from the report by McLean, Spirling and 
Russell mentioned in footnote 28. 
2  Robert Walpole is considered Britain’s first prime minister (1721-1742). 
3  Draft Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European 
Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, as agreed at negotiators' level on 14 November 2018, 
TF50 (2018) 55, Commission to EU27, Brussels 2018. 
4  According to the most authoritative work on parliamentary procedure in the UK (Erskine May, Par-
liamentary Practice) the so-called 1604 rule states: ‘A motion or an amendment which is the same, in 
substance, as a question which has been decided during a session may not be brought forward again 
during that same session.’ Thus, the propositions put forward had to be formally different. However, 
in practice the question remained whether the Withdrawal Agreement was accepted. 
5  Commons, meaningful votes: motion 293 (15 January 2019); motion 354 (12 March 2019); motion 
395 (29 March 2019). 
6  Commons votes on a no-deal Brexit: 29 January 2019 (motion 312, passed 318-310); 13 March 2019 
(motion 359, passed 321-278; 3 April 2019 (motion 409, passed 313-312). 
7  Debate in Commons 29 January 2019. 
8  As a result of an amendment tabled by Oliver Letwin (motion 373 passed 329-302, 25 March 2019). 
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of eight indicative votes were held. However, all of these options failed. A second 
round of indicative votes was held on 1 April 2019 on four of the proposals that had 
failed in the first round but might pass if reconsidered. Surprisingly, however, none of 
these alternative options passed. 
 
 
Cartoon © Jos Collignon 
 
The issue I want to investigate is what actually went wrong? Could there have been a 
majority for one of these proposals, and why were there so many abstentions? Succes-
sively, I’ll discuss the referendum, the quantitative outcome and its perceived meaning, 
and the form and outcome of the ‘meaningful votes’ and the ‘indicative votes’ in Par-
liament, and some historical parallels with the unsuccessful voting efforts on reforming 
the House of Lords. 
2. The Brexit Referendum 
The question put on the ballot paper of the referendum on Brexit on 23 June 2016 
was: ‘Should the United Kingdom remain a member of the European Union or leave 
the European Union.’ Nine days before the referendum took place, almost two 
hundred academics from universities in the UK led by Alan Renwick of University 
College London protested in an opinion in the Telegraph: ‘A referendum result is de-
mocratically legitimate only if voters can make an informed decision. Yet the level of 
misinformation in the current campaign is so great that democratic legitimacy is called 
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into question’.9 The main point was that the public, i.e. the voters were being delibera-
tely misinformed and were therefore unable to make an informed decision.  
Next to the issue of misinforming the public, the Royal Economic Society reported 
on the referendum question itself.10 From a scientific perspective of voting theory, 
Colignatus argued: ‘The Brexit referendum question can be rejected as technically un-
satisfactory. One could even argue that the UK government should have annulled the 
outcome based on this basis alone.’ In short, the question is misleading. The problem 
is that this ‘question assumes a binary choice – Remain or Leave – while voting theory 
warns that allowing only two options can easily be a misleading representation of the 
real choice.’11 The hidden complexity in the case of the Brexit question was: what does 
leave actually mean? Does leave imply the adoption of another framework, such as 
EFTA or WTO? Will the UK remain intact or split?12 Although heavily criticized, the 
Electoral Commission argued that the recommended question was clear and straight-
forward for voters.13  
 
 
Cartoon © Jos Collignon 
 
Another difference from earlier referendums in the UK was that the Brexit referendum 
had no clear yes-or-no question but two statements about two different issues: leave 
and remain. The implicit other options were, for instance: leave with a deal, leave wit-
hout a deal, or remain. The referendum, for instance in Scotland on the creation of a 
                                                        
9  Renwick, A. et al., The Telegraph, 14 June 2016, Opinion. 
10  Colignatus, ‘Voting theory and the Brexit referendum question’, Newsletter April, Royal Economic So-
ciety, 2017. 
11  Colignatus 2017. 
12  Colignatus 2017. 
13 United Kingdom Electoral Commission, Referendum on membership of the European Union: Assessment of the 
Electoral Commission on the proposed referendum question, September 2015. 
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national assembly contained the following statements: ‘I agree there should be a 
Scottish Parliament’ and ‘I do not agree there should be a Scottish Parliament’.14 Alt-
hough the Brexit referendum statements were meant to be clear, the presence of other 
options left room for a stalemate. But even then, a deadlock was possible. One of these 
options is called a ‘cycle’. ‘Take for example three candidates A, B and C and a parti-
cular distribution of preferences. When the vote is between A and B then A wins. We 
denote this as A > B. When the vote is between B and C then B wins, or B > C. When 
the vote is between C and A then C wins or C > A. Collectively A > B > C > A. 
Collectively, there is indifference. It is a key notion in voting theory that there can be 
distributions of preferences, such that a collective binary choice seems to result into a 
clear decision, while in reality there is a deadlock in hiding.’15  
A third issue was the legal consequence of the Brexit referendum. Although a re-
ferendum as such in the UK is non-binding, the government unconditionally promised 
to implement the result of the referendum. That was an important difference from the 
referendums held in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland in 1997 and 1998 on a form 
of self-government and the creation of national assemblies. The Welsh, Scottish and 
Northern Ireland referendums were pre-legislative and ‘only’ investigating whether 
there was support for the creation of national assemblies. These referendums also sti-
pulated that a national assembly could only be created if supported by at least 50% of 
the votes and 40% of the electorate. These minimum requirements were met and the 
national assemblies were created in 1998 (Northern Ireland) and 1999 (Scotland and 
Wales). These criteria, however, were not met in the Brexit referendum. In fact, the 
Brexit referendum had no criteria at all for meeting certain minimum requirements.  
A fourth issue related to the Brexit referendum was the composition of the elec-
torate. The four constituent countries of the UK: England, Wales, Scotland and Nor-
thern Ireland, do not have equal terms on the right to vote. Whereas the minimum age 
to vote is 18 years, in Scotland 16 and 17-year-olds were allowed to vote in the Scottish 
independence referendum of 2014. The Electoral Commission reported positively on 
this expansion: ‘This referendum showed that for young people, indeed for all voters, 
when they perceive an issue to be important and are inspired by it, they will both par-
ticipate in the debate and show up on polling day’.16 The rationale was that young 
people would be most affected by the outcome of a referendum and therefore should 
take part. However, a proposal by the House of Lords to lower the minimum age to 
16 years in the Brexit referendum was rejected by the House of Commons (303-253).17 
The argument made on behalf of the government by Lord Faulks was: ‘We want to 
avoid any allegations of interference and we fear that changing the franchise, including 
this particular change, could be seen as doing exactly that and could seriously under-
mine the legitimacy of the referendum. (…) However, we have to ask ourselves 
                                                        
14  The referendums in Wales and Northern Ireland contained the same type of yes-or-no statements: ‘I 
(do not) agree there should be a Welsh Assembly’, and: ‘Do you support the [Good Friday] Agreement 
reached at the multi-party talks on Northern Ireland and set out in Command Paper 3883?’.  
15  Colignatus 2017. 
16  Electoral Commission, Scottish Independence Referendum Report on the referendum held on 18 September 2014, 
Edinburgh 2014. 
17  House of Commons, 8 December 2015, division 144 against the Lords amendment to extend the 
franchise for the European referendum to 16 and 17-year-olds (303-253). The House of Lords had 
accepted this amendment on 18 November 2015 (293-211). 
None of the Above 
 
 
127 
whether, in our desire to enthuse 16 and 17-year-olds, we may be in danger of placing 
too great a responsibility on them’.18 Lord Tyler (Liberal Democrat) very subtly argued 
against this with the following rebuttal: ‘Will the noble Lord tell us whether he has seen 
the film ‘Suffragette’?19 The argument that he has just been advancing was the argu-
ment for not giving women the vote until after the First World War and then for not 
extending it to those under the age of 28. Those arguments were deployed by his con-
temporaries, as it were, of that period’.20  
Finally, the right to vote was limited to: British citizens, Irish citizens, or Common-
wealth citizens, who were resident in the UK or Gibraltar, were registered to vote and 
were not legally excluded from voting. Additionally, British citizens who had lived 
abroad for less than 15 years were also allowed to vote. Thus, British citizens who had 
been living abroad for a longer period were excluded. Also excluded from voting were 
EU citizens resident in the UK, whereas a possible Brexit would probably have sub-
stantially influenced the legal status of these latter categories.  
3. Results of Brexit Referendum 
The outcome of the Brexit referendum ‘stunned’ the world, so it seems on reading the 
Washington Post or the BBC website.21 But if one studies the polls and the comments 
more closely it is not improbable that a too-close-to-call prediction was overruled by a 
combination of wishful thinking and gamblers who simply did not believe that Brexit 
could really happen.22  
The often-stated result of the referendum was that 48% voted to remain and 52% 
to leave the EU. However, that is not the whole picture. The first remark is that this is 
the overall result of the UK. If one looks at the results per country there is an interes-
ting difference. Two countries, Scotland (62%) and Northern Ireland (56%) voted to 
remain, whereas the other two countries Wales (53%) and England (53%) voted to 
leave. One might call that a draw. However, if you include those who did not vote, 
either because they were not interested or because they did not know what to vote for, 
the picture becomes different: each of these three categories gets about a third of the 
votes. This also means that only 38% of the electorate voted to leave, which would not 
meet minimum requirements in other referendums. As mentioned above, however, 
there were no minimum requirements to meet in this referendum.  
                                                        
18  House of Lords, 18 November 2015, volume 767, c.175-176. 
19  Suffragette, movie by Sarah Gavon (2015), on the struggle for women in 1912 in UK to obtain the right 
to vote. 
20  House of Lords, 18 November 2015, volume 767, c.177. 
21  Swanson, A., ‘Five charts capture the world’s stunned — and scary — reaction to Brexit’, Washington 
Post 24 June 2016. Likewise, on the site of the BBC 24 June 2016: ‘Brexit: Europe stunned by UK 
Leave vote’. 
22  Nate Cohn, ‘Why the surprise over Brexit? Don’t blame the polls’, New York Times, The Upshot, 24 June 
2016. 
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Chart 1 Brexit Vote 
Sources: Centre for Migration Law; Grütters, C., E. Guild, P. Minderhoud, R. van Oers & T. Strik, Brexit 
and Migration, a study by the Odysseus Network requested by the EP’s Committee on Civil Liberties, 
Justice and Home Affairs, Brussels 2018, Chart 1, p. 12; BBC <www.bbc.com/news/politics/eu_referen-
dum/results>. 
 
The actual differences between the number of leave voters (17.4 million) and remain 
voters (16.1 million) was 1.3 million: 2.7 % of the electorate of 46.5 million. Interes-
tingly, the number of abstentions (28%) was ten times the majority of 2.7%. The results 
of the Brexit referendum have been analysed, for instance on the issue of age. Accor-
ding to the website ‘Lord Ashcroft Polls’ age correlates with voting behaviour: ‘The 
older the voters, the more likely they were to have voted to leave the EU.’23 So, if the 
16 and 17-year-olds had been allowed to vote then the electorate would have increased 
by some 1.5 million voters. If there is a clear correlation between age and voting beha-
viour, it would be fair to state that three-quarters of these young voters would have 
voted to remain. Considering a small percentage of abstentions amongst these young-
sters, probably about 1 million extra remain votes would have been cast, which would 
have almost closed the gap between leave voters and remain voters.  
                                                        
23  Lord Ashcroft Polls, 24 June 2016 <lordashcroftpolls.com/2016/06/how-the-united-kingdom-
voted-and-why/>.  
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Chart 2 Age of Brexit voters 
Sources: Lord Ashcroft Polls; BBC. 
If we also take into account the preferences of the 3.8 million EU citizens resident in the EU and the 1.3 
million British citizens who had been resident in the EU for more than 15 years, who had not been allowed 
to vote, one might seriously question whether the outcome of the Brexit referendum actually reflected ‘the 
will of the people’.  
4. May’s Deal in Parliament 
Prime Minister May tabled her deal on Brexit three times and lost these meaningful 
votes three times in the Commons. These results are interesting if the changes in voting 
behaviour are observed. First, it has to be noted that the defeat decreased: from the 
historical loss of 230 on the first Brexit vote (202-432), the loss was reduced to 149 in 
the second vote (242-391) and finally ended with a loss of 58 (286-344) in the third. 
Overall, one might say that each time May’s deal was tabled, the results ‘improved’: the 
second vote showed a reduced gap of 81 (from 230 to 149) and the third vote reduced 
that gap again to 91 (from 149 to 58). Simple mathematics would have recommended 
having a fourth vote: another reduction of an average between 81 and 91 would have 
changed the defeat into a victory: 328-300. That, however, did not happen: politics 
never obeys the logic of a mathematical model.  
Every MP who was allowed to vote did so in the first vote (15 January 2019). In 
this period there was a vacant seat (Newport West) so the totals did not add up to 650 
but 649. The only non-voting MPs were those who never vote, i.e. the MPs of Sinn 
Fein (7), the Speaker (1) and his deputies (3), and the Tellers (4). Thus, the total number 
of votes was 634 and an absolute majority could be reached with a minimum of 318 
votes. Although everyone voted in the first vote, this changed in the second and third 
votes. The second vote (12 March 2019) showed one abstention. The third vote (29 
March 2019) showed 4 abstentions. The only abstention in the second vote came from 
Mr Douglas Ross, Conservative MP for Moray. Mr Ross had voted No in the first and 
abstained in the second. Interestingly, Mr Ross changed his mind again in the third 
round and voted Aye. The remaining changes comparing votes1 and 2 were not unex-
pected: 39 Conservatives and 1 Labour MP changed from No to Aye. The third vote 
showed another 41 Conservatives and 2 Labour MPs changing from No to Aye. Apart 
from the move of Mr Ross, 4 MPs abstained in the third vote (2 Labour, 1 SNP and 1 
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Independent). These changes were very effective. The ratio of the change in majority 
over the number of changing votes is the effectiveness ratio. This ratio varies between 
0 (no effect) and 2 (maximum). The change in majority in vote 2 (81) was caused by 41 
MPs; an extremely high effectiveness ratio of 81/41=1.98; vote 3 provided a change 
of 91 with a comparable high effectiveness ratio of 1.90.  
 
Meaningful votes on May’s deal 
 
Brexit vote-1 
motion 293 
15-01-2019 ch
an
ge
 1
-2
 
Brexit vote-2 
motion 354 
12-03-2019 ch
an
ge
 2
-3
 
Brexit vote-3 
motion 395 
29-03-2019 
Ayes  202  +  40  242  + 44  286 
Noes  432  −  41  391  −  47  344 
Majority  − 230  −  81  − 149  −  91  − 58 
Abstentions  0  +  1  1  +  3  4 
 subtotal  634   634   634 
Others24  15   15   15 
 total  649   649    649 
 MPs who changed their vote; its effect on the majority; effectiveness-ratio 
  change vote 1-2  change vote 2-3 
  ∆ votes ∆ maj. ratio  ∆ votes ∆ maj. ratio 
all parties   41  − 81  1.98   48  − 91  1.90 
Table 1 Meaningful votes on May’s deal 
Source: <commonsvotes.digiminster.com> 
 
An interesting phenomenon occurred every time after these lost votes on May’s deal. 
The Commons voted three times against a no-deal Brexit, meaning that although May’s 
deal was voted down a majority of the Commons was against leaving the EU without 
a deal. These three motions were not the same, due to the ‘1604-rule’.25 However, the 
tenor was the same: to prevent the UK leaving the EU without a deal. The first vote 
had a majority of 8. The second even had a majority of 43, but the third and last vote 
had the smallest margin possible: just one. The changes did not occur within one party. 
Vote 1 compared to vote 2 showed for the Conservatives: 5 moving from No to Aye; 
2 from Aye to Abstention; 1 from Abstention to No; and 26 from Abstention to No. 
Thus, 34 Conservatives changed their mind resulting in a majority change of 33 (effec-
tiveness ratio of 0.97). Labour was divided: 3 changed from Aye to Abstention, but 
another 3 changed from Abstention to Aye, an effectiveness ratio of zero. The results 
of the third vote against a no-deal Brexit showed 52 changes. However, of the 26 Con-
servatives that changed in the second vote from No to Abstention, 24 changed back 
in the third vote from Abstention to No. Likewise, 4 Conservatives who changed in 
the second vote from No to Aye, changed back from Aye to No in the third vote.  
                                                        
24  ‘Others’ refers to votes which are not cast: Speaker (1), Deputy Speakers (3), Sinn Fein (7) and Tellers 
(4).  
25  See footnote: 4. 
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 Against a No-Deal Brexit 
 
vote-1 
motion 312 
29-01-2019 
ch
an
ge
 1
-2
 
vote-2 
motion 359 
13-03-2019 
ch
an
ge
 2
-3
 
vote-3 
motion 409 
03-04-2019 
Ayes  318   3  321  −  8  313 
Noes  310  −  32  278    34  312 
Majority   8    35   43  −  42   1 
Abst.  6    29  35  −  26  9 
 subtotal  634   634   634 
Others  15   15   15 
 total  649   649    649 
MPs who changed their vote; its effect on the majority; effectiveness-ratio 
  change vote 1-2  change vote 2-3 
  ∆ votes ∆ maj. ratio  ∆ votes ∆ maj. ratio 
Cons.   34  33  0.97   37  −  27  0.73 
Lab.   7  1  0.14   11  −  13  1.18 
LibDem.   0       0     
SNP   0       0    
remaining   4  1  0.25   4  −  2  0.50 
 total   45  35  0.78   52  −  42  0.81 
Table 2 Against a No-Deal Brexit vote 
Source: <commonsvotes.digiminster.com> 
5. Indicative Votes on the House of Lords Reform 
In contrast to the meaningful votes on May’s deal, the indicative votes on 27 March 
2019 and again on 1 April 2019 showed a different, less organised pattern of voting. 
Holding a series of indicative votes was meant to break a deadlock by investigating 
other options. In theory, it promised a way out. First, MPs could put forward their 
preferred alternative to May’s deal to the Speaker. Second, the Speaker selected the 
proposals which would be debated and third, after the debate, the MPs could vote on 
each proposal.  
This had been done before. The preamble to the Parliament Act 1911 states that 
the Act is a temporary measure only: ‘it is intended to substitute for the House of Lords 
as it at present exists a Second Chamber constituted on a popular instead of hereditary 
basis, but such substitution cannot be immediately brought into operation’.26 This 
House of Lords reform was debated several times in the Commons. However, three 
attempts to bring this substitution into operation failed in 1949, 1968 and most recently 
in 2003. This effort to reform the constitutional structure of the UK was to a certain 
extent comparable with the efforts to deliver on Brexit: it failed repeatedly.  
                                                        
26 Preamble Parliament Act 1911 (1 & 2 Geo. 5 c.13).  
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In 2003, eight propositions were put forward in a series of indicative votes on the 
House of Lords reform. These proposals varied from: (a) abolishment of the House of 
Lords; (b) wholly appointed; (c) wholly elected; (d-h) six different options for a hybrid 
House of partly elected and partly appointed peers.27 Voting took place in a regular 
manner: a division was called and MPs had to walk through one of the lobbies to re-
gister their vote. Thus, the planning was that eight divisions would be called. 
At the end of the day, the Commons had rejected all options: a surprising result. 
McLean, Spirling & Russell have written a rather interesting article on this attempt to 
reform the House of Lords trying to explain what Parliament did.28 ‘How, then, did 
the Commons come to vote against all eight options put up to it, leading itself into the 
contradiction of voting for the status quo by voting against the status quo?’.29 The 
authors provide three hypotheses to explain the paradox. First, the loss of the abolition 
vote could have triggered actions from a group of MPs, which influenced the outcome 
of the other votes. Second, MPs did not succeed in coordinating their votes across the 
seven remaining options. Third, some MPs made mistakes, which made a crucial dif-
ference given the closeness of the outcome on some options.30 The last hypothesis is 
illustrated by the fact that in the absence of party whips to direct the MPs into the 
‘correct’ lobby to vote, and the fact that a number of divisions were not called, some 
MPs did not vote on the vote they thought they were voting on. After the division on 
the wholly elected option, it was expected that a division would be called to vote on 
the 20% elected option. However, that did not occur: The Speaker called the division 
off and his judgment was not challenged. Subsequently, the Speaker presented the next 
option and called a division on the 80% elected option. However, not all MPs were 
aware of that and had their no vote for what was assumed the 20% elected option 
registered for the 80% elected option which they actually supported. Through this 
mistake the 80% elected option failed (283-286); without the mistake it would have 
passed (287-282), and the House of Lords would have been reformed in 2003.31 
6. Indicative Votes on Alternative Brexit Deals 
Initially, 16 proposals were put forward to the Speaker of which 8 were selected. As 
none of the 8 proposals passed in the first series, a second series of indicative votes 
were held on 4 favourable options. The voting method was using ballot papers, rather 
than having MPs walk through one of the lobbies to register their vote. ‘Some have 
argued that the indicative votes held on Brexit would have worked better had a diffe-
rent voting system been used – either “exhaustive voting”, the “alternative vote”, or 
“majority judgement”.’32 Anyhow, this method of indicative votes using ballot papers 
had no precedent as the 2003 votes on the House of Lords reform used ‘classical’ 
                                                        
27  These options were: 20% elected - 80% appointed; 80%-20%; 40%-60%; 60%-40%; and 50%-50%.  
28  McLean, I., A. Spelling & M. Russell, ‘None of the Above: The UK House of Commons Votes on 
Reforming the House of Lords’, February 2003, The Political Quarterly, 2003 (84), p. 298-310.  
29  McLean, Spelling & Russell 2003, p. 308. 
30  McLean, Spelling & Russell 2003, p. 309. 
31  McLean, Spelling & Russell 2003, p. 305. 
32  Indicative votes on Brexit <https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/explainers/indicative-
votes> [14/5/2019]. 
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division on each option. Four proposals as an alternative to May’s deal were put for-
ward twice: (1) Customs Union (between the UK and the EU) (Conservative); (2) Com-
mon Market 2.0 (membership of EFTA and EEA) (Conservative); (3) Public vote (to 
confirm any Brexit deal) (Labour); (4) Revoke Art. 50 (no Brexit at all) (Scottish Na-
tional Party). 
 
Indicative votes on Brexit alternatives 
 Customs Union Common Market Public vote Revoke Art. 50 
 vote-1 vote-2 vote-1 vote-2 vote-1 vote-2 vote-1 vote-2 
Ayes  265  273  189  261  268  280  184  191 
Noes  271  276  283  282  295  292  293  292 
Majority  − 6  − 3  − 94  − 21  − 27  − 12  − 109  − 101 
Abstention  102  89  166  95  75  66  161  155 
Others33  11  11  11  11  11  11  11  11 
 total  649  649  649  649  649  649  649  649 
MPs who changed their vote and its effect on the majority 
 ∆ votes ∆ maj. ∆ votes ∆ maj. ∆ votes ∆ maj. ∆ votes ∆ maj. 
Cons.  21  1  31  − 7  23  8  20  − 1 
Lab.  8  6  58  59  8  8  31  14 
LibDem.  4  − 4  4  − 2  0    0   
SNP  0    32  32  3  -1  4  − 2 
remaining  5  0  13  − 9  2  0  5  − 3 
 total  38  3  138  73  36  15  60  8 
effect.-ratio  0.08  0.53  0.42  0.13 
Table 3 Indicative votes on Brexit alternatives 
Source: <commonsvotes.digiminster.com> 
 
Next to the fact that all these options were defeated, it is clear that revocation of Art. 
50, which would call off the deal completely including the ticking clock of Brexit day, 
was the least supported option. The majority of Noes only changed from 109 to 101. 
However, it took 60 MPs to get this change of 8 (effectiveness ratio: 0.13). This was 
caused by opposing efforts: 10 MPs changed from Aye to Abstention, but 19 changed 
in the opposite direction from Abstention to Aye; 3 changed from Aye to No, but 1 
moved from No to Aye; and 15 from No to Abstention, but 12 from Abstention to 
No. One might think that such a change was caused by one of the parties. In this case, 
it was not. Changing one’s mind in opposite directions occurred within parties. On this 
proposal, 20 Conservatives changed their vote resulting in a majority change of 1 (ef-
fectiveness ratio: 0.05). With Labour, a similar thing happened although less effectively: 
31 votes changed the majority to 14 (ratio: 0.45).34  
The story with the Customs Union is a bit different. Although both indicative votes 
failed, the majority remained very small: -6 and -3. The effectiveness ratio here was 
even smaller than the one for the revocation option: 0.08. It took 38 changing votes to 
                                                        
33  Tellers were not used. 
34  10 more Labour Ayes and 4 less Labour Noes. 
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change the majority to 3. If this effectiveness is inspected on party level, big differences 
become apparent. 21 Conservatives changed their vote only influencing the majority 
by 1 (0.05). On the other hand, 8 Labour MPs changed their vote influencing the ma-
jority by 6 (0.75). The LibDems were very effective in this vote: 4 changing votes chan-
ged the majority to 4. Finally, 5 Independent MPs changed their vote in such a way that 
their effectiveness was zero. The votes on the Common Market option showed the 
biggest change of majority. This change of 73 was caused by 138 changing votes (ratio: 
0.53). Here 31 Conservatives changed the majority to 7 (0.23), and 58 Labour MPs 
changed the majority to 59 (1.0) in the opposite direction. 32 SNP MPs changed the 
majority to 32 (1.0), and 4 LibDems caused a majority change of 2. Overall, 22% of the 
MPs changed their vote in an uncoordinated way. Subsequently, it still failed but the 
majority moved from -94 to -21. The fourth proposal in the series of indicative votes 
was to hold a public vote and was the only proposal by the Labour Party showing a 
decreasing majority from -27 to -12. This change of 15 was brought about by 36 votes 
(ratio: 0.42). Interestingly, this was the only vote that showed a decrease in the majority 
(of Noes) by all parties.35  
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7. So? 
There was a misleading campaign, an ambiguous question, an unclear choice, a non-
binding referendum on which the results would nevertheless be implemented, and an 
electorate whose composition was at least not optimal. So, one might seriously question 
whether the outcome of the Brexit referendum actually reflected ‘the will of the 
                                                        
35  Except for the SNP that realized only one change from Aye to Abstention. 
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people’. Initially, it seemed implausible that all options were voted down, but it hap-
pened. In particular the number of abstentions that could have made a difference is 
noticeable. Most likely the absence of coordination of voting and a questionable choice 
for the method of the indicative votes (ballots) determined the negative results. British 
politics has manoeuvred itself into a deadlock. Looking back, one might say that Mur-
phy’s law applied: ‘if there’s any way they can do it wrong, they will’. The real question 
is whether British politics is able to admit that there is a crucial difference between 
voting and deciding. 
 
